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Abstract. 
 
This paper examines the current and potential ability of ‘community development financial 
institutions’ – institutions aimed at reducing the incidence of financial exclusion at the bottom 
end of the capital market – to reduce poverty, and the fiscal implications of this process. It 
seeks to connect the growing literature on labour supply functions for the self-employed  with 
the literature on poverty and measures to escape from it, generating in the process a ‘poverty 
exit function’ which is then estimated against data (at this stage, a pilot sample of 45 self-
employed households only, plus their employees) for three UK cities. Our model, by analogy 
with the ‘poverty trap’ models sometimes used in developing countries, has potentially self-
reinforcing features, in which in the presence of certain parameter values efforts to get out of 
poverty only make the problem worse; but this, to our knowledge, is the first application of 
such a model to an industrialised country. 
 
The quantitative analysis indicates a negative role, in escaping from the poverty trap, for 
uninsured shocks. It indicates a  positive role for formal education and for institutional 
measures which protect against risk; indeed, some of independent variables such as training 
are significant only if interacted with protection against risk, implying that simple injections of 
inputs are insufficient as a support policy for the sector. We make a preliminary investigation 
of the fiscal savings arising from investment in the CDFI sector, of which the upper bound is 
about £350 million a year or about 1.5 per cent of the total social social security budget; these 
impacts, however, are sensitive to variations in the policies of both CDFIs and the various 
levels of government support for the sector. The qualitative part of the analysis, in addition, 
suggests a positive role for ‘integrated support’ to microentrepreneurs which combines 
finance, mentoring and training. 
 
We have observed that many escapes from the poverty trap are achieved by employees 
rather than by entrepreneurs, which draws attention to the importance of growing along a 
labour-intensive production function, which ironically was in our sample secured better by 
small-to-medium firms than by start-up enterprises. Finally, a key variable in the exit-from-
poverty process is the ‘regeneration multiplier’: the extent to which benefits provided by 
CDFIs remain within, or leak outside, target areas of high social deprivation. This multiplier 
varied greatly across our samples, being highest in Glasgow and lowest in Sheffield. We 
surmise (and proper analysis of this parameter is an important agenda for future research) 
that the regeneration multiplier varies negatively with the wage level and positively with the 
level of human capital inside regeneration areas. Diversification of financial products, and  
accompanying expenditure in support of regeneration areas by incentives to source labour 
and materials locally, could be a useful addition to this policy agenda.   
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1. Introduction 
                 In spite of the decline in most poverty indicators over recent years 
in Britain (Sutherland, Sefton and Piachaud 2003), there is evidence that 
many households, especially at the lower end of the income distribution, 
continue to be trapped in severe and sometimes increasing levels of 
deprivation. For many at the bottom end of the income scale, not only has 
there been no improvement in material conditions over the years since 1997 
but levels of vulnerability to an income shock have markedly increased1, in 
defiance of many policy initiatives established to prevent this.  Awareness that 
the social protection system ‘could do better’ in achieving the Government’s 
objective of reducing poverty has stimulated a number of enquiries into these 
initiatives, which in many cases have concluded that if the living conditions of 
the poorest are to be improved, there is no escape from putting more 
resources into the system (Goodman et al. 2004….). However, as is well 
known, the putting of resources directly into social security may incur the cost 
of reducing the incentive to work and thereby distorting the smooth functioning 
of the labour market ;it will also cost money. Thus there is at least a potential 
conflict between the major Government objective of reducing poverty, the 
major Government objective of achieving a more open labour market and the 
major Government objective of avoiding an increase in the fiscal deficit. 
 
 In this context it is interesting to review the effectiveness of one 
instrument of social policy which, at least in potential, has the ability to 
reconcile these objectives, namely intervention at the bottom end of the 
capital market to combat financial exclusion2. Under the name of 
microfinance, this approach has made considerable headway in the 
developing world, to the point that some pressure groups have set a target for 
half of global poverty to be eliminated by this means over eight years (Hulme 
and Mosley 1996, 1998; Morduch 1999) and it has now attracted attention in 
the UK also. The prime minister has emphasised the ‘need to look at how 
small amounts of credit and capital can be made available for promoting 
business ideas in Britain’s poorest areas’ and, more recently, the hope has 
been expressed that microfinance may be able to help households cope with 
rising levels of household debt and debt arrears (United Kingdom, Social 
Exclusion Unit 2004). The national labour market, and the livelihoods of many 
low income people, have recently been shifting from employment towards 
self-employment (see figure 1), thereby increasing the importance of 
institutions which support the bottom end of this sector of the market. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Within the lowest income group, earning less than £11, 500 a year, the burden of debt has 
more than doubled over the last five years, from 15% to 35% of total income (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, 2004) and the number of people struggling with debt problems has 
risen by 47 per cent over the last five years (Citizens’ Advice, cited in Bridges and Disney 
2003:5) 
2 The exclusion of low-income people and neighbourhoods from financial services has been 
documented for many years (Kempson 1990?, Whyley 1993?), but the emergence of a range 
of institutions aimed directly at combating it in a manner which competes directly with the 
monopolistic provision of moneylenders is largely an invention of the 1990s.  
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Figure 1: The growth of self-employment in UK 1990-2004 
 
 
             
 
In the UK, microfinance fits into a group of initiatives, known as community 
development finance, ‘which seek to widen the access of disadvantaged 
people and neighbourhoods to capital and other financial services. Such 
services include microfinancial services provided for example by credit 
unions; neighbourhood regeneration initiatives, such as community loan 
funds; and loan funds and social banks targeted at relevant sectors, such as 
small businesses, community and social enterprises, or charities’ (Rogaly et al 
1999:3). But everywhere, microfinance instruments share a common 
technique, which is to use methods of peer-pressure, intensive loan 
supervision and incentives to repay to overcome the problem that lenders, at 
the bottom end of the capital market, suffer from asymmetric information 
about borrowers’ type and cannot protect themselves by taking collateral, 
which borrowers by assumption are too poor to offer. And especially in 
industrialised countries where systems of social security exist, they offer the 
potential benefit of being able to resolve the trade-off mentioned earlier, by 
enabling poor people to make a sustainable exit from long-term poverty at no 
or very small fiscal cost. But is this benefit currently being realised by the 
forms of microfinance which exist in Britain, and could it be more effectively 
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realised by changes in policy or institutional design? These are the questions 
to which this paper is addressed. There are four elements in our story: a 
discussion of the structure of the microfinance (community development 
finance) sector and of motivation within it; a review of its impact on the labour 
market; a model of escape from the ‘poverty trap’; and, emerging from all this, 
a discussion of the fiscal consequences of alternative ways of developing the 
microfinance sector. It should be emphasised that our conclusions are 
illustrative rather than definitive, since the dataset on which we draw is 
derived from samples of 45 small businesses and their employees within the 
cities of Belfast, Glasgow and Sheffield. The questions asked were qualitative 
as well as quantitative; and the qualitative data on mechanisms of causation, 
in the process of exposing flaws in the quantitative data, also helps to some 
extent to overcome the limitations of small sample size, in a manner that is 
described in Section 3 below.    
 
 
2. The community development finance sector in relation to the 
labour market and poverty 
 
               We begin by presenting a picture of the community development 
finance sector in Britain as it is currently constituted. Notable features of  this 
landscape (table 1) include: 
 
Firstly , community development finance institutions (CDFIs) are typically 
managed by the voluntary, not-for profit sector, although there is substantial 
financial participation by national government (in the shape of the DTI’s 
Phoenix  Fund, being wound up this year) and  regional and local 
government, in the shape of advisory and mentoring services. In Scotland the 
support for CDFIs goes beyond this, and nearly all support for CDFIs, both 
financial and technical, goes through the regional government. 
Secondly, CDFIs remain small and thus unable to realise economies of scale. 
The average clientele of the 55 institutions reporting to the Community 
Development Finance Association in 2004 was 119 (Mc Geehan 2005:3). 
Although it is true that lending to the sub-prime sector, without access to 
commercial bank loans, is much more of a niche market in Britain than in 
developing countries where financial exclusion is the rule rather than the 
exception, it is notable that very few  UK institutions have achieved the 
commercial dynamism of, say, the commercial financial services firm First 
National Provident, which, has 2,000, 000 clients, even in the process of 
charging average interest rates of 58% on unsecured loans, well over twice 
the rates charged by the average CDFI (McGehan 2004, appendix 3) – or 
indeed.  
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Table 1.The structure of community development finance in Britain 
 
Institution Number of 
loan 
clients(2004) 
Value of 
lending 
(£million, 
2004) 
6-month 
arrears rate 
(2004) 
Return on 
capital/SDI/other 
indicators of 
viability 
Sampled 
institutions: 
    
DSL  360 3 8  
SENTA c.45 0.3 15  
ASPIRE 150+ 0.6 9  
UK total 6523 45   
UK average 119 0.9 9  
 
Source: for sampled institutions, 2002 sample; for bottom two rows, McGeehan(2004) 
 
Third, and related to this, no CDFI of which we have knowledge has yet 
achieved complete financial sustainability, in the shape of profitability without 
subsidy3. Two CDFIs, East Lancs Moneyline and ASPIRE Belfast (the latter 
one within our sample) are close to this objective and within sight of achieving 
it in a year or two. Although this fact on its own does not damage the case for 
CDFIs – since it takes time to move down the cost curve and CDFIs have the 
potential, as we shall see, to yield substantial externalities – it does, of course, 
impair the claim that CDFIs provide social protection in a manner that inflicts 
no fiscal burden on the taxpayer. This issue will be taken up again in section 4 
on fiscal impact.  
Fourth, and partly in an attempt to extend the market, there has been a 
diversification of the sector from its antecedents in lending for the 
development of small businesses to a broader base, already somewhat 
inhabited by local credit unions, in consumption lending designed to help 
individuals manage what is often a worrying burden of debt (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, 2004). For some successful CDFIs, such as East 
Lancs Moneyline, most of the growth over the last couple of years has been 
on the consumption-lending side.  
Fifth, and perhaps most worryingly of all, few CDFIs make proper use of the 
arsenal of weapons developed by microfinance institutions in developing 
countries to counter the problem of asymmetric information which leads to  
clients being financially excluded in the first place. Very few institutions use 
peer-monitoring of clients through group lending and otherwise; few use 
incentives to repay (although several do charge a lower rate for repeat than 
for first-time customers, which is a simplified version of this); only a few offer 
any diversity of financial products; and most charge interest rates which are 
too low to cover the costs of borrowing, capitalisation, administration and 
likely loan-loss, issues which are clearly related to the issues of portfolio size 
and arrears mentioned earlier. As a consequence, arrears rates of CDFIs in 
Britain are higher  than they are for microfinance institutions in developing 
                                                 
3 Footnote may be needed on Yaron’s (or other) Subsidy Dependence Index. 
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countries4, even though incomes, and in principle ability to service loans, are 
much higher.  
Thus the sector, innovative though parts of it are, can reasonably be 
represented as a sector whose potential has not yet been fully realised. 
 
         Next we describe the sequence of causation between community 
development finance institutions and social indicators. This runs from lending 
activity by CDFIs, to supply and demand for labour in employment and self-
employment in the small business sector, to  indicators of need and 
deprivation themselves. The process is formally modelled in the Appendix. 
 
Labour demand and supply  
 
We operate with a simple labour demand function in which demand for labour 
in the self-employment sector responds to the wage offered, a measure of 
wage uncertainty , the turnover of the business and a measure of access to 
credit or financial exclusion which we interpret as the frequency of having 
been turned down for a loan. With respect to business income, we have 
discovered within our three city samples a kink in the demand curve for labour 
(Figure 2), which we ascribe to the influence of risk: any labour hiring runs the 
risk, unless supervised in a way that is not always feasible, of reducing rather 
than increasing productivity, and the consequences of the risk going wrong 
are much more serious for a fledgling enterprise with unestablished reputation  
and no financial reserves than for an established enterprise, even a small 
one. Enterprise G95  commented, very typically for our sample: ‘I feel that the 
trust issue at the start of the business is too important to employ a stranger’. 
                                                 
4 The Microbanking Bulletin, November 2003, quotes an average six-month arrears rate for 
microfinance institutions in developing countries of 4 per cent – or half the UK rate. 
 
5 Our sample is described in Appendix 2. Institutions are coded by city (G=Glasgow, B=Belfast, etc.) 
and number. 
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Figure 2. Demand functions for low-income labour: Sheffield and 
Glasgow 
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(i) An increase in wage uncertainty, which as discussed produces a 
movement into the self-employment sector; 
(ii) An increase in the amount or effectiveness of financial provision to 
the financially excluded, if the measures described earlier are 
successful in reducing financial exclusion;  
(iii) An increase in small businesses’ willingness to invest, modelled by 
us in terms of not only conventional  ‘accelerator’ terms but also in 
terms of the perceived vulnerability of the entrepreneur. 
 
We now discuss how it may be possible for CDFIs and policy towards them to 
influence (ii) and (iii). 
 
 
The demand for low-income labour and the dynamics of exit from poverty 
               From the point of view of poverty reduction, what matters is not the 
amount of labour taken on, or equilibrium employment creation, but the extent 
to which increases in self-employment reduce poverty, -either within the 
entrepreneur’s household or within the households who derive employment 
from the self-employment sector – and how long such reduction lasts. 
Although many CDFIs, as we have seen, seek to target their lending within 
areas of high social need, there is as yet little information on how widely 
practised or effective such targeting is. A fortiori, we do not know the 
allocation of the multiplier effects of CDFI expenditure on poor as against non-
poor people. 
     In order to understand how well microfinance enables people to 
make a sustainable exit from poverty, it is useful not simply to observe how 
long such exits last, but also to ask what are the barriers to exit which keep 
poor people poor, as these may provide a key to the processes by which 
escape can be facilitated and made sustainable. To understand these barriers 
better, we conducted a number of some qualitative case studies within the 
three cities which we studied. A selection of these is provided in Appendix 2, 
and they suggest that not only is the failure rate higher among start-up 
businesses, but it is higher still among start-up businesses whose owners are 
below the poverty line, in particular within groups which may be the subject of 
discrimination such as ethnic minorities. (Some cases are described in 
Section 3 below.)  Indeed, some of the most vulnerable small businesses  
become trapped in a vicious circle of high vulnerability, low rate of return, low 
asset quality and limited risk-sharing. There are four particular reasons for 
this: 
(i) smaller businesses, and especially sole traders, may have less 
access to economies of scale and bulk ordering, and thus pay 
higher prices for inputs; 
(ii) smaller and more vulnerable businesses may have less good 
access to processes of quality certification and control, and as a 
consequence receive lower prices for their outputs; 
(iii) smaller and more vulnerable businesses may not be able to afford 
adequate insurance premia for their assets, which leaves them 
additionally vulnerable to shocks such as burglary; 
(iv) smaller and more vulnerable businesses may be more socially 
isolated, and in particular may have less access to informal sources 
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of short-term credit and moral support in the event of a shock. In 
our empirical work, we found this vicious circle to operate 
particularly powerfully in the case of ethnic-minority businesses. 
 
In other words, being trapped in a state of continuing poverty, for many 
people, derives not only from having low assets, but from the fact that 
situational constraints make it hard for low-income entrepreneurs to use those 
assets effectively and to achieve high rates of return on them. The approach 
which we take to this problem (Figure 3), by analogy with the ‘poverty trap’ 
models sometimes used in developing countries (e.g. Zimmerman and Carter 
2003, Carter and May 1999; Barrett et al 2002  ) acknowledges these 
potentially self-reinforcing features, in which in the presence of certain 
parameter values efforts to get out of poverty only make the problem worse. 
Their implication is that CDFI policies to spring the poverty trap for low-income 
individuals need to consist not just of the making available to them of inputs 
from whose ownership they are excluded, but also of measures to enable 
them to make and protect a worthwhile return on these assets once the 
capital market is open to them.   
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Figure 3. A view of the ‘poverty trap’ within the self-employment sector 
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Notes: 1. Feasible rate of return shifts up or down in relation to the technical maximum (and 
makes escape from poverty trap more or less feasible) as a consequence of  shifts in the 
level of social capital influenced by insurance and other policy instruments) and certain forms 
of government expenditure . Depending on the value of these variables, the poverty trap 
either opens or stays closed. 
 
 
These are of two kinds: 
(i) individual attributes which give low-income families a bargaining 
advantage in their attempts to utilise resources effectively; 
(ii) policies which achieve the same objective.. 
 
          Human capital, in the shape of applied knowledge relevant to 
increasing business income and social capital, in the shape of membership of 
social networks, represent illustrations of the first kind of variable: they both, in 
principle, provide an asset which helps a vulnerable business withstand a 
shock. The second is well illustrated by complementary expenditures by 
public authorities at central and local government level (such as New Deal 
and Business Links, respectively) and also by the actions of some 
microfinance institutions themselves, in the shape of emergency support 
which enables their clients to withstand shocks. In the absence of such 
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support, not only may their clients not escape from the trap represented by 
Figure 3, but shocks which hit people currently above the poverty line may 
push them below it in a way that is long-term and persistent (Dercon, 2005). 
In both cases, success in the use of such instruments has one fundamental 
attribute: it controls and limits the level of risk associated with investment by 
and for low-income people, in order to raise the attractiveness and safety of 
investment at a given expected rate of return. By effectively controlling the 
level of risk associated with poor people’s investment, the negative interaction 
between income and rate of return is countered. 
 How this was done in Glasgow, Sheffield and Belfast is illustrated by 
some of the case studies in  Appendix 2. The common thread underlying them 
is not only that control of risk is important but also that if achieved it provides a 
key unlocking the effectiveness of other factors of production; and by the 
same token, if lost (Case Study 4), it may deprive the other factors of 
production of effectiveness.  We may illustrate by means of the diagram of 
Figure 4.  This presents a possible client’s-eye view of the low-income 
household’s livelihood, and of the possible role of supporting institutions within 
it. The variables on the graph are expected income flow from a small business 
(on the vertical axis) and risk (on the horizontal axis); they exist in a positive 
relationship, so that in general high-return ‘promotional’ projects involving new 
technology with a good chance of high rates of return (e.g. in zone C of the 
diagram) are also high-risk, and by contrast low-risk projects (such as those in 
zone A) are in general simply ‘protectional’ of the household’s livelihood and 
show low rates of return. It is our hypothesis that most of the unemployed see 
themselves as being in zone A, and see all possible escape routes from 
dependence on benefits as being attended by massive downside risks, the 
consequences of which are more serious, the smaller and less liquid are the 
assets which they have available to deal with those risks (the lower their risk 
efficacy). The two parallel lines running from southwest to northeast are the 
upper and lower boundaries of the capital market, which can be seen as a 
river which the client household has to navigate; it is a river which, as we shall 
see, contains a number of hidden eddies and rocks, but what is clearly visible 
are the crocodiles on the southern bank, which is marked ‘financial exclusion’. 
To avoid this outcome at all costs, vulnerable clients in zones A and B 
typically do not aim for the middle of the river, but rather navigate close to the 
left bank during its most dangerous reaches, allowing themselves to drift back 
into the centre, and face moderate levels of risk, only when assets – and 
hence risk efficacy – have built up to a sufficient point (the ‘risk-avoiding 
trajectory’ on figure 4). 
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Figure 4:  Risk and yield in the self-employment sector 
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The experience of the case studies illustrates the interaction between factors 
of production, shocks and institutions such as microfinance interventions.  In 
case study 1, at the top end of the small business market, the lender provided 
sufficient financial capital, and in case studies 2 and 3 the lender and the 
clients between them constructed sufficient social capital, to provide a buffer 
(level of risk efficacy) against the shock. The rate of return function, in figure 
3, was pulled up by effective institutional defences against risk. By contrast, in 
case study 4 both social and financial capital assets collapsed, in a vicious 
circle: the failure of the client’s financial safety-net, in the shape of an 
insurance policy, depleted her own self-confidence and willingness to push on 
in face of adversity, some of which was caused by a decline in her social 
networks. The combination of shock, lack of assets, and lack of institutional 
support, rather than any one of these in isolation, kept the client in the poverty 
trap and kept the level of the rate of return (r) below its critical level (r*)  
 A particularly important consequence of the achievement of control 
over risk efficacy is an increase in what in the model of the Appendix is 
referred to as the ‘regeneration multiplier’: that is, the extent to which money 
injected into areas of social deprivation such as Easterhouse, the Manor 
(Sheffield 2) and West Belfast remains within those areas, and thereby is able 
influence dimensions of the social environment such as crime rates and 
quality of school provision. 
 We now seek, using data from Sheffield, Glasgow and Belfast,  to 
simulate the ‘critical values’ of the key parameters which determine whether 
individuals escape from the trap. 
 
 
  
 
 
3.Empirical findings: social impact6
 
We examined the income and employment dynamics of 45 entrepreneurs and 
their employees in Belfast, Sheffield and Glasgow over a period of two years, 
from 2000 to 2002, with a follow-up survey in November 2003.The transition 
matrix  for these households over the years examined was as given in Table 
2: 
                                                 
6 nb will need to be completely rewritten when we have some proper data from the EF survey 
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Table 2. Sample data: transitions from employment and unemployment into 
self-employment (period March 2000 – March 2003) 
 
          Status 
          post 
         2003 
Status 
Pre 2000 
Employed or 
unemployed, 
business failed 
Self-employed, business still trading 
(plus amount of employment created 
2000-3) 
 S G1 G2 B Total S G1 G2 B Total 
Employed      1 3+16   4+16 
Self-employed   2 1 3 1+1 8+84 1 10+12 20+97 
Unemployed: 
less than 6 
months 
More than 6 
months 
1    1 3+1 4+15
 
 
1 4+2 
 
1 
12+18 
 
1 
 
sub-total, 
transitions 
out of 
unemploy
ment = 31 
Full-time 
education 
     1 1   2 
Other      2    2 
Grand totals 1  2 1 4 8+2 16 
+115
2 15+14 41+131 
 Code: S= Sheffield; G1= Developing Strathclyde Ltd./ Glasgow Regeneration Fund; G2 = 
Scottish Enterprise (previously Wellpark Enterprise Trust) B=ASPIRE,Belfast. 
Sample size: 45, subdivided as indicated. ‘Sustainable exits’ from unemployment are 
shaded. 
 
Descriptive data for our three inner-city samples are provided in Table 3. 
Average income and assets of the entrepreneurs we surveyed, and of their 
employees were within the bottom tercile for the UK. Sixty out of 131 people 
(self-employed people plus employees) were below the poverty line (less than 
half average earnings) in 2000, and of these thirty-three (twelve self-employed 
and eighteen employees) made the transition out of poverty between 2000 
and end 2003. There is evidence that levels of education and of social capital 
were significantly higher among clients of community development finance 
institutions who although financially excluded were able to access credit from 
specially designed institutional sources (ie. for whom G* is relatively high), 
and this interaction takes an important role in our later analysis.  
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Table 3. The samples: summary statistics for survey areas 
 
Criterion Interviewee 
group sample 
mean 
Control group 
sample mean 
t-statistic for 
differences 
between sample 
means 
Initial conditions: 
 
 
Further or higher 
education((%) 
34.2 8.3 4.81** 
Financial exclusion7 69.0 94.0 1.24 
Client summary data: 
Turnover (£/annum) 106750 33000  
Assets 12775 3800  
Employment 
generation (2000-
2003): 
DSL(Glasgow) 
ASPIRE (Belfast) 
SENTA(Sheffield) 
 
Employment 
generation amongst 
previously 
unemployed (2000-
2002): 
DSL(Glasgow) 
ASPIRE(Belfast) 
SENTA(Sheffield) 
 
 
4.4 
7.8 
1.4 
0.5 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
2.3 
0.2 
0.3 
 
 
2.3 
3.3 
1.0 
0 
 
0.7 
 
 
 
1.7 
0 
0 
 
 
2.08* 
 
 
 
0.42 
Social capital 
indicator(%) 
 
DSL 
ASPIRE 
SENTA 
 
0.37 
 
0.50 
0.37 
0.66 
 
 
 
0.16 
 
0.05 
0.50 
0.25 
 
 
 
1.78* 
Source:  survey interviews, Feb-March 2002 and follow-up interviews, Nov 2003 ( raw data 
can be inspected in Mosley and Steel (2002b), Appendix) ** denotes significance of the t-
statistic at the 1% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Definitional  notes: 
The control group (n=7) consists of clients S7, B5, B14b,G3, G5,G7,G17, who had either not 
received their loan yet or else in 2002, too recently to have gained obvious benefit from it. The 
treatment group (n=38) consists of the other borrowers. 
Financial exclusion: had ever been refused a loan or overdraft by a commercial bank or other 
financial institution. 
Employment generated: person-years of employment created per firm since January 2000. 
Social capital/community-building indicator: answered yes to the initial question: ‘Do you feel 
part of a social network with other small businesses?’ which on enquiry was expanded into 
‘Do you consciously exchange ideas with other businesses, customers or suppliers in the 
process of formulating your own business strategy? 
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It is clear that the range of benefits which microfinance institutions are able to 
provide goes beyond the conventional quantitative measures listed in Table 3. 
There are a number of potential externalities, in particular in the field of the 
possibility of improving several dimensions of the inner-city environment, from 
social relationships to house prices, through an impetus which begins with 
action to counter financial exclusion. There is evidence that achieving these 
externalities may require financial diversification. One model for this is 
provided by ‘homesteading schemes’ (Henderson 2003): the essential 
approach is to provide a housing loan with a guaranteed or subsidised return 
for tenants on ‘problem estates’ with a high level of crime, vandalism and drus 
abuse, with the intention that this will gove them an equity stake in their local 
community. The loan is conditional on specified improvements to the housing 
stock by the tenant, and may be backed by a buyback guarantee, such that 
the risk attached to the tenant’s investment is minimised. In terms of the 
externalities it provides, this product is therefore a natural for CDFIs – but it 
will require financial innovation far beyond what they have typically embraced, 
requiring a combination of equity, insurance and loan products – and, in the 
hands of one CDFI, it has already helped to turn house values around, and 
apparently reduce crime rates, on the Foxhill estate, one of the most deprived 
areas of Sheffield. 
Mindful of the range of channels through which impacts are produce, 
we now proceed to estimate ‘poverty exit functions’ for the members of the 
population described in Tables 1 and 2 according to the model described in 
the previous section. Certain peculiarities and limitations of the analysis 
should be explained at the outset. In the first place, the dependent variable is  
change in income,  estimated separately for businesses, for employees and 
for those who made the transition across the poverty line. The sample size is 
therefore 109 entrepreneurs and their employees, of whom, as earlier 
discussed, 34 had made it above the poverty line by the time of the resurvey.  
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Table 4. Poverty exit functions: alternative specifications 
 
 OLS estimation. Dependent variable: income increase amongst: 
 Whole sample (n=109) Exits from 
poverty only 
(n= 34) 
Entrepreneurs only 
(n=45) 
Equation 1a 1b 2 3 
Regression 
coefficients on 
independent 
variables: 
    
Constant -30905** 
(2.75) 
-8126 
(1.18) 
6447 
(0.14) 
-34392** 
(3.98) 
Amount of borrowing 
from community 
development finance 
institutions 2000-
2002(G*) 
  -21890 
(0.92) 
0.27 
(0.47) 
Financial exclusion 
(F) 
   -0.34** 
(3.19) 
Physical capital 0.27** 
(3.53) 
0.28** 
(4.25) 
  
Social capital (S) 1884 
(0.55) 
 4426 
(0.58) 
684.6 
(0.53) 
Human capital 1 (H): 
formal qualifications 
9152* 
(2.39) 
 31429** 
(3.94) 
4698 
(1.28) 
Human capital 2(H) 
Applied training 
related to current 
enterprise 
1823 
(0.39) 
 -27557 
(1.64) 
4550 
(1.12) 
Interaction 
term:human capital 2 
* defences against 
risk 
 3124** 
(3.53) 
  
Shocks (Z) -4116* 
(2.40) 
1672 
(0.21) 
11754 
(0.43) 
 
Institutional defences  
against risk ( E ) 
9423** 
(2.56) 
 18971* 
(2.18) 
 
Ethnic minority 
dummy 
 -2660 
(0.41) 
-21890 
(0.92) 
 
New Deal dummy    22115** 
(3.67) 
Wage uncertainty 
σ(Ws) 
    
R2 0.51 0.43 0.66 0.65 
N 109 109 34 63 
Variable definitions: (nb. symbols refer to notation in Table 1): 
Financial exclusion (F): had ever been refused a loan or overdraft by a commercial bank or other 
financial institution. 
Human capital 1(formal): scored higher education =3, education 16-18=2, education to 16 only = 1. 
Human capital 2(informal): no applied training =0, applied training in last three years 4 weeks or less=1, 
applied training in last three years 4 weeks or more =3. 
Social capital/community-building indicator(S): graded 1-3 on the basis of the answers to the following 
questions:  
(1)‘Do you have personal or professional contacts with other small businesses in the same area? 
(2)Do you have personal or professional contacts with other small businesses outside the immediate 
neighbourhood? 
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(3) ‘Do you have personal or professional contacts with staff of government or NGOs associated with 
supporting the small business sector (e.g. Business Links, etc)’. 
Institutional defences against risk: graded 1-3 on the basis of : mentoring organised by the microfinance 
provider; business contacts organised by microfinance provider; emergency loans, financial advice or 
insurance advice arranged by microfinance provider. 
New Deal: 1 if interviewee accepted New Deal recruits during last year, 0 otherwise. 
Ethnic minority dummy: 1 if white, 0 if non-white.  
Shocks dummy: 1 if has experienced income decline of 20% or more in the last year, 0 otherwise. 
Notes. Figures in parentheses below coefficients are Student’s t-statistics.* denotes significance of a 
coefficient at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 The preliminary conclusions from Table 4  suggest, among the 
variables in our model, a negative role for shocks and a  positive role, in 
transitions across the poverty line, for physical capital and for human capital in 
the formal sense of educational qualifications. Institutional defences against 
risk are, are we surmised from our case studies, very important particularly in 
the transition across the poverty line , as in the story of  Figure  3   above: 
they opened the gateway to opening the poverty trap in some cases, and their 
absence kept that trap shut on the subject of Case Study 4.  Indeed, human 
capital in the practical sense of applied training was only significant when 
interacted with protection against risk, suggesting that the two factors of 
production have to work together to be effective, as in Case Studies 1 and 3. 
For entrepreneurs, previous experience of financial exclusion and also the 
ethnic minority dummy exerted a continuing negative influence on the change 
in income, but the latter variable was not significant. Loan size, somewhat 
worryingly for the CDFIs, had no significant role in poverty transition. 
 
     
4. Estimated fiscal impact 
                We now estimate the fiscal impact of the community development 
finance sector, as it is and in the presence of various hypothetical policy 
changes. We do this in two different ways. First, we begin from a crude 
estimate of change in unemployment within the sample due to microfinance, 
which (Table 1) is 31 from a sample of 45 clients, or 0.67 jobs created for 
every new microfinance client . At estimated average earnings within the three 
sample areas, this equates to a saving on unemployment benefit payments of 
£0.3 million on what would otherwise have been paid.  If grossed up to an 
estimated 32,500 clients of microfinance institutions in the UK (table 5) we get 
an estimate of 21,900 (2.4 per cent of the national unemployment total) 
individuals exiting from unemployment as a consequence of microfinance 
lending over the period 2000-02, which given the estimated distribution of 
earnings for the sample implies a saving of  £178 million on the national social 
security budget).  A second approach to the same calculation is to compare 
the change in the self-reported receipts of social security payments (Appendix 
2) of microfinance clients between the before-loan period (2000) when in 
many cases they and their employees were receiving social security 
payments, and the same self-reported payments in the comparison year 
(2003). This approach has the merit of picking up interactions between the 
supply of financial services, unemployment benefit and other social security 
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payments, which may be considerable8 . This approach yields the estimates 
listed in table 5. 
 
  
 
                                                 
8 For example, not only may the supply of microfinance in a direct way reduce unemployment and thus 
the payment of unemployment benefit, but also in an indirect way it may improve health, for example 
because the supply of financial services encourages a more purposive attitude to diet and exercise. In 
such a case, not only does unemployment benefit decline, but sickness benefit as well.  
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Table 5. Estimated fiscal impact:  contribution of microfinance to  
reduction of unemployment and social protection expenditure (2000-3) 
on different assumptions 
 
 
Assumption Within-sample 
change in 
unemployment due 
to microfinance 
Corresponding 
fiscal impact (change 
in social security 
budget) 
£million 
Corresponding 
national-level 
fiscal impact (change 
in social security 
budget) 
£million 
Impact of community 
development finance 
institutions on central 
government social security 
spending: 
1)By simple extrapolation: 
Unemployment benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
2)By self-reporting of 
social security payments: 
Unemployment benefits 
 
Sickness, disability and 
other benefits 
 
Total 
 
  
 
0.4 
 
 
0.15 
 
0.55 
 
 
237 
 
 
88 
 
325 
Policy simulations 
i.Financing of start-up 
businesses only 
 Decrease to 
0.28 (-27%) 
Saving decreases to 
165(-27%)  
ii.Change in 
New Deal subsidy to 
£60/week within 
regeneration areas 
  
Increase to  
0.64(+9%) 
 
 
Saving 
increases to 
354(+9%) 
 
 
iii.Increase in labour 
intensity (as per DSL) 
 Increase to  
0.97(+42%) 
Saving 
increases to 
573(+42%) 
iv. Increased risk 
protection expenditure by 
CDFIs, as per ‘best cases’ 
in sample 
 Increase to 
0.57(+4%) 
 Saving  
 increases to 
338(+4%) 
 
Sources and methods.  
Row 1(simple extrapolation): within-sample change in unemployment due to microfinance 
(Table 1), multiplied by unemployment benefit due according to the earnings distributions in 
Appendix 2, grossed up to national level using an estimate of 250 microfinance institutions in 
UK (verbal estimate from Department of Trade and Industry Small Business Service) 
Row 2 (self-reported social security payments): average social security payments to 
microfinance operators and their employees in year before loan, less current payments to the 
same group (£3736/annum unemployment benefit, £1417/annum other benefits) times 
number in sample (109), grossed up to national level using an estimate of 250 microfinance 
institutions in UK (verbal estimate from Department of Trade and Industry Small Business 
Service) 
Policy simulations: 
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1 (New Deal): increases assumed CDFI injection by 33%, applies this to coefficient of New 
Deal on earnings (Table 4 ); this is then used to generate an estimate of reduced social 
security spending by using the all-sample ratio between changes in increased earnings and in 
social security expenditure. 
2 (Labour intensity): Reduction of social security benefits per CDFI loan assumed to be £5305 
per loan per annum, as it is for DSL (the most labour-intensive of the three organisations 
examined) rather than £3736 which is the sample average.  
3.(Start-up businesses only):Reduction of social security benefits per CDFI loan assumed to 
be £2727, as it is for SENTA (which only lends to start-up businesses) rather than £3736 
which is the sample average. 
4. (Increased risk protection expenditure) Risk protection expenditure raised to 3 for all poor 
interviewees (subjects 1-34 in sample) from current mean level of 1.86 and substituted into 
equation 1b(table 4) 
 
We now examine the sensitivity of these estimates to changes in policy and  
institutional design: 
Targeting:  Some organisations, such as SENTA within our sample, 
concentrate on lending to start-up businesses only, often on the premiss that 
a focus on smaller and more vulnerable businesses will do more to stimulate 
the market.  In Table 5 we simulate this policy by imagining that the 
employment and fiscal impact is the same for all organisations within our 
sample as it is for SENTA. The consequence is to reduce the fiscal saving, 
because start-up businesses do not in general, certainly within our sample, 
create so much employment, nor therefore reduce the social security budget, 
so much as established small-to-medium enterprises. 
 
National policies: The fiscal impact is also sensitive to the size of the 
‘regeneration multiplier’: which within our samples is only 0.22, one-third of 
the overall employment multiplier of 0.67. A  possible approach to this 
problem is to raise the New Deal employment subsidy (currently £40 per week 
applicable for a maximum of 26 weeks) to £60 per week, and/or to increase 
the eligibility period of the subsidy to nine months. This would raise the 
regeneration multiplier and target the New Deal subsidy on areas of highest 
social deprivation.  In our simulation, this leads to a reduction in social 
security payments below the base case of 9%. 
Regional and local NGO policies. The impact of microfinance services is 
sensitive not only (as demonstrated by Table 1) to the level of a client’s  
human capital but specifically to the level and effectiveness of training and 
mentoring provided either by CDFIs themselves or (more commonly) by 
independent  service providers established by local authorities or NGOs. 
These forms of human capital have an especially important impact: as we 
discovered in Table 4, the payoff to appropriate risk-protection expenditures 
by the supplying institution is crucial and significant. In Table 5 we simulate 
this form of institutional innovation by examining the effect of increased risk-
protection expenditure by CDFIs. We do this in a slightly unorthodox way,by 
overriding the estimating equation (1b) in Table 4 and substituting the 
assumption that for all low-income clients institutional defences against risk 
were at their highest possible level of 3. The impact turns out to be minor.  .  
 
However, there is little doubt that, beyond this, many individual CDFIs would 
be able to increase their impact further by amendments in their interest rate 
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policies, diversification of their financial product mix,  and improvements in 
their defences against asymmetric information problems. 
 
 
 
  
5. Lessons for policy 
  We have provided evidence, we believe, of substantial social 
and fiscal impact already achieved by the UK CDFI sector, but also of 
substantial and so far unfulfilled potential. 
  The starting-point for our analysis is that for most people, 
especially at low incomes, labour is the main source of income, and therefore 
the reduction of poverty depends on the expansion of the market for labour 
and of poor people’s role within it. The section of the market under 
examination here, which is self-employment, has in recent years been 
growing under the impetus of trends towards lesser security in other labour 
markets, which in principle gives the CDFI approach a fair wind, as does 
government approval of its  ‘financially sustainable’ approach to redistribution. 
But at present sustainability is a long way off for most CDFIs, and the supply 
side of the market has been quite slow in adapting for the context of UK inner-
cities what are now quite a robust set of rules of thumb for the organisation of 
finance without collateral. 
  In search of a way forward, we attempted to adapt to the UK 
context a class of ‘poverty trap’ models typically applied to less developed 
countries, in which the rate of return falls, and the discrepancy between actual 
and potential output increases, as income falls. To counter this vicious circle, 
policy and institution-building need over the long term to counter the natural 
and  relational factors which define the trap, the most severe of which is risk. 
Policies to increase the risk efficacy, or ability to defend against risk, of low-
income people therefore form a crucial and necessary element in the strategy 
of CDFIs, as of other anti-poverty institutions. Indeed, our empirical analysis 
finds that several of the traditionally key factors in expanding the incomes of 
the poor, such as social capital and some elements in human capital, are not 
in themselves statistically significant except in association with institutional 
defences against risk. Thus the realisation of many elements in the potential 
contribution of CDFIs, including the fiscal one, waits on an effective solution of 
this problem of institutional design. 
 Some of this solution is already coming, not from the CDFIs 
themselves, but from  complementary agencies within government, which in 
industrialised countries (including those of Eastern Europe) occupy a much 
larger share of the structure of support for microfinance than in most 
developing countries, where a minimalist finance-only model is much 
commoner.   In several cities (Birmingham is the illustration most salient in our 
case studies), there is clear support for the approach of  Maloney et al. (2000) 
and Lowndes and Wilson (2001)) that, far from social capital being a factor of 
production created purely by individuals, local government can also act as an 
agent in its construction, and thereby supply what on the evidence of Table 4 
is a key input in the emergence of sustainable small businesses. But other 
parts of the solution come from the imaginations of the managers of 
microfinance institutions themselves. We have observed the great importance 
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in this context of insurance against shocks, and microfinance institutions can 
assist in providing this, both by linking up with appropriate insurers and even 
more importantly by institutional support (emergency lending, mentoring and 
advice) which in many ways anticipates the need for and provides a quasi-
substitute for insurance.  
             We have observed that many escapes from the poverty trap are 
achieved by employees rather than by entrepreneurs, which draws attention 
to the importance of growing along a labour-intensive production function, 
which ironically was in our sample secured better by small-to-medium firms 
than by start-up enterprises which represent the typical target for ‘poverty-
focussed’ initiatives. In achieving this, a key variable in the exit-from-poverty 
process is the ‘regeneration multiplier’. This varied greatly across our 
samples, being highest in Glasgow and lowest in Sheffield. We surmise that 
the regeneration multiplier varies negatively with the wage level and positively 
with the level of human capital inside regeneration areas9; but beyond this, it 
may require innovation in the range of financial products, as discussed in 
relation to the Sheffield ‘homesteading’ scheme in section 3 above. It may be 
that expenditure in support of regeneration areas by initiatives to source 
labour and materials locally could be a useful addition to this policy agenda.  
To find out whether these hypotheses are true is an important part of the 
agenda for future research. 
                                                 
9 For example: hiring within regeneration areas within our sample was highest in Drumchapel, 
Glasgow, which had the lowest wages, the highest levels of human capital and the highest 
levels of local government support expenditure. 
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Appendix 1:The model 
 
There are four building-blocks within our model: labour supply and demand in 
the ‘self-employed small business sector’ and other sectors; risk attitudes and 
investment within the self-employment sector, investment, risk-sharing, and 
the impact of policy; and rates of return. The notation is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table A1. Notation 
 
R  rate of return 
 R* risk (probability of livelihood in small 
business sector falling below 
specified level) 
 
ρ   risk-aversion coefficient 
Y   Income 
A   Assets 
Ah Skills (human capital assets) 
S social capital 
a4 Regeneration area multiplier (see 
equation (6) and Appendix) 
E Institutional defences against risk 
(mentoring,emergency loans, etc) 
F Measure of financial 
exclusion(experience of being refused 
a loan) 
G*  Government ‘pro-small business’ 
expenditure 
G** ‘insurance’ expenditure by 
government and NGOs 
Ws Wage in self-employment = total 
hourly remuneration from work 
B Value of social security benefits (per 
hour) 
σ(Ws) Uncertainty of self-employed wage 
V  vulnerability index 
  
  
(1a)Labour supply  
Parker et al. (2005) discover from US data that supply of labour to the self-
employment sector is positively associated with wage uncertainty, where the 
self-employed ‘wage’ is defined as the hourly total remuneration from work 
(Parker et al 2005:191). The presumption is that employees work harder when 
wage uncertainty increases to make the deterministic element in their income 
larger. In addition we may expect that labour supply will vary positively, as per 
conventional micro theory, with the wage offered and negatively with the level 
of benefits:. 
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Ls (S) = constant + a1ws + a2B + a3 σ(Ws)                                   (1)
 
 
 
(1b) Labour demand 
We operate with a simple labour demand function in which demand for labour 
in the self-employment sector responds to the wage offered, the wage 
uncertainty measure, the turnover of the business and a measure of access to 
credit or financial exclusion, F, which we interpret as the frequency of having 
been turned down for a loan: 
 
Ld (S) = constant + a4Ws + a5 σ(Ws) +a6Y  +a7F                    (2)                                 
 
With respect to business income, it will be recalled that we discovered within 
our three city samples a kink in the demand curve for labour (Figure 2 above), 
which we ascribe to the influence of risk: any labour hiring runs the risk, 
unless supervised in a way that is not always feasible, of reducing rather than 
increasing productivity, and the consequences of the risk going wrong are 
much more serious for a fledgling enterprise with unestablished reputation  
and no financial reserves than for an established enterprise, even a small 
one. Enterprise G9  commented, very typically for our sample: ‘I feel that the 
trust issue at the start of the business is too important to employ a stranger’. 
Because labour market impacts are the key channel of poverty-reduction the 
ironic implication, to be explored below, is that more poverty is reduced by 
lending to small-to-medium firms than by lending to start-up microenterprises.  
  
 
(2)Risk attitudes and investment in the small business sector.   
 
 Investment in the small business sector varies directly with expected profit  
(which in turn is influenced by macro and local economic conditions) and 
indirectly with the individual’s risk-aversion coefficient, as defined below. 
 
I = f(∆Y,ρ)                                                                        (3) 
 
 
Households’ measure of risk-aversion ρ (typically the Arrow-Pratt 9 
measure)10 is determined, in the light of previous empirical work (Mosley and 
Verschoor 2005) as a linear function of their perceived level of vulnerability. 
Vulnerability, we assess as  a measure with four subjective components: 
memories and expectations of vulnerability; expectations of short-term income 
variation; perceived risk of undertaking entrepreneurial behaviour; and self-
respect and perceived own status( Mosley and Verschoor 2005).  The risk-
aversion function is of a ‘satisficing’ type which is asymmetric in gains and 
                                                 
10 An individual’s ‘Arrow-Pratt 9 measure’ ρ is estimated as (αZ –λ) (λ2//2 +(α – Z2/2 – αλZ) ) where Z 
= prize in lottery, α = probability of winning the prize, and λ  is the individual’s reservation price, 
calculated as his or her answer to the following question: 
‘Imagine that you are about to play a lottery with the following payoffs: $1.5 with probability (α)  = 
0.75; 0 with p=0.25. What is the minimum amount I have to give you so that you forego playing?’ 
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losses (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979. Kahnemann 2003 ): risk aversion 
increases a great deal if vulnerability increases, but does not decline much if  
vulnerability declines. For detail of the vulnerability scale we used, please see 
the simulation below.  ) 
 
ρ  = a8 + a9 (V)                                                                 (4) 
 
For purposes of modelling below we shall interpret the influence of wage 
uncertainty on labour supply into the self-employment sector, discussed in 
relation to equation (1) above, as being subsumed within the vulnerability 
parameter V. 
 
 
(3)Portfolio allocation and risk management. 
Each individual household protects itself against adverse circumstance as 
best it can: it maximises its risk efficacy, the ratio of total assets to perceived 
risk. Within households the allocation of resources is determined by a 
bargaining process which at this stage we do not define : each person within a 
household is simply allocated a share of household assets β dependent on 
their individual bargaining strength. Risks are divided into two groups r1 
(caused by nature, cannot be influenced by human behaviour) and r2 
(interpersonal, can be influenced by human behaviour). Social capital S is 
inversely proportional to r2. Following the empirical analysis of Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000, 2003) we assume that there is, for natural risks, partial but 
unequal risk-sharing; in other words, over any time period the change in the 
volume of assets A depends on the systematic component defined by (3) plus 
a share of a random shock Z , the share being determined by bargaining 
strength. 
 
Thus, change in assets ∆A = I((∆Y,ρ) + ßZi                                      (5) 
 
(4)Rates of return in the self-employment sector. For both the self-
employed small business sector (for which we use the subscript a) and the 
large business sector (subscript b), there exists a distribution of yields (ra, σa; 
rb, σb). This distribution of yields can be influenced by external agencies 
through the level and targeting of their expenditure: 
  
ra/rb = a3 +a4G* +a5G**    + a6 E                                                            (6) 
 
where E consists of the availability of institutional devices to reduce risk 
 
This function needs careful specification: indeed, there exist a range of 
microsimulation models which have attempted to estimate the social impact of 
expenditure changes in functions such as (6). In our approach there are two 
dimensions of impact which need modelling; the extent to which support 
expenditure is targeted within low-income regeneration areas (which we 
describe as the ‘regeneration multiplier’ and represent by the coefficient a4) 
and the extent to which policy interventions which are not directly aimed at the 
self-employment sector but which, by reducing risk, impinge on its productivity 
and hence profitability. We represent these by the symbol G**.  
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Within each sector a and b, as illustrated in Figure 2, the rate of return 
function is, for the self-employment sector:  
 
ra* - ra = f(A: S, G*, G**, E)                                                                     (6a) 
 
and for the large business sector: 
 
rb* - rb = f(A: S, G)                                                                              (6b) 
 
 
where G* is government ‘pro-small business’ expenditure and  S is social 
capital. G* is obviously a policy variable, but social capital is notoriously 
difficult to influence: in particular, it is not traded in any market and so cannot 
be incentivised through increases in its price. However, it can be incentivised 
through offers of insurance against  misplaced trust, which can be engineered 
institutionally. In addition (Mosley and Verschoor 2005) there is evidence that 
social capital levels in particular communities are influenced (negatively) by 
intragroup inequality, and also by various elements of communities’ ‘ social 
history’ including experience of common adversity11. 
 
Taking entrepreneur’s income (Y) as the product of rate of return (r) and 
change in assets (∆A) and substituting from (1) and (2) into (3), (4) and (5) we 
have for the time path of income for each individual i: 
 
Yi = ρ(V) (A, Ah: S, G*, G**, E) {I((∆Y,ρ) + ßZi}}                                           (6a) 
 
And for that individual, the probability that he will cross the poverty line within 
a  defined time period is the change in income multiplied by a poverty 
transition coefficient α:   
 
∆Pi = α[ ρ(V) (A, Ah: S, G*, G**, E) {I((∆Y,ρ) + ßZi}}   ]                              (7)                           
 
 
 This function (7) is the one which we seek to use as an explanation of 
the household poverty transitions discussed below. For employees in the 
small business sector the labour demand function (2) clearly comes into play, 
as for them escape from poverty is determined by the probability of being 
employed in the small business sector. By (2) the probability of being 
employed in the small business sector is dependent on small business 
income, credit constraints and the wage in the small business sector, and so 
                                                 
11 Two characteristics of social capital are relevant to this process of accumulation and 
decumulation of assets. In the first place, social capital, unlike much human and physical 
capital, is divisible into small units; this is advantageous for the very poor, since access to it is 
not restricted by capital market imperfections. However, in the second place, access to it is 
restricted by social barriers and cleavages which cause social linkages with one person to 
damage social linkages with another. Geof Wood’s ‘Faustian bargains’ (Wood 2003), in which 
poor people, to reduce their exposure to risk, form patron-client relationships with richer 
protectors which then preclude their access to other relationships and pathways out of 
poverty, are an illustration of this ‘non-additive’ property of social capital. 
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we may write for the likelihood of moving out of poverty through employment 
in the small business sector:  
 
∆Pi (E)= α (Ws, σ (Ws),Y, F) [ ρ(V) ( A,Ah: S, G*, G**) {I((∆Y,ρ) + ßZi}}  ]         (7a)        
 
 
This is the reduced form estimated in Table 4 above.            
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Appendix 2: Data 
Quantitative data 
This section presents the data used to support the argument and in particular 
to produce Tables 4 and 5. 
 
(This bit is in SPSS/Excel and will not reproduce electronically) 
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Qualitative data 
The qualitative section of the appendix presents four case studies : one of 
triumph (where the borrower grew so rapidly as to swim free of the need for 
loan finance), one of disaster (collision with the ‘right bank of the river’), and 
two of what is much commoner for small businesses than either – a crisis 
(i.e,a drift backwards and/or towards the right bank of the river) followed by 
the adoption of coping strategies , with many ups and downs around an 
almost-static trend of sales in real terms. These anecdotes, in turn, illustrate 
some possible policy lessons to take up in the final section. 
 
Table A3. Crisis coping strategies 
 
(a) Happy ending: crisis resolved 
• Case Study 1: ‘G4’ Nursery manager, Glasgow G21 
 
             As part of the process of part-privatisation an NHS hospital in Springburn, 
Glasgow, put its nursery facilities out to tender; the competition was won by the 
interviewee. Her experience is in various nurseries working for the Glasgow Education 
Authority, following training as a nursery nurse. After being ‘given the run-around for 
months’ and finally turned down by one commercial bank, she then approached a second 
bank  and was told ‘it’s an awful lot of money for a young girl to be borrowing’. Finally, 
with help from the government-financed local economic development company Glasgow 
North, she was able to assemble a financing package from Developing Strathclyde Ltd 
(DSL). 
 
              Having started in 1997 with three staff and a client base of four children, she now 
(Feb 2003) has 80 children and fifteen staff, (six of whom have come off the dole), and 
would like to take on an extra five staff: the fastest rate of growth of employment or 
turnover that we have encountered in our forty-five case studies, for all that some of the 
labour is part-time. In her experience motivation is the key factor – much more than 
qualifications and experience – in hiring decisions, and the most demotivated recruits 
have come via the New Deal (for 16-25). ‘One (New Deal) girl came in her tracksuit and 
sat there on the couch chewing gum, looked out of the window and said ‘Don’t 
know…Don’t know’ to every question’.  Her profit is £22,000 on a turnover of £195,000.  
She now scarcely needs DSL finance: she has ‘graduated’ across the left bank of the 
river – trajectory 1 on figure 4. 
 
(b) Intermediate cases: business surviving, but sales have reached plateau, or 
crisis unresolved 
 
Case Study 2: ‘S3’ Gardener, Sheffield 9  
               
            Male client in his 40s,left school at 15, with criminal record including a period in prison, 
initially unable to get small business loan, or even savings account, from commercial bank on 
account of being unemployed. In January 2000, received his first loan of £2800 from SENTA 
(Sheffield Enterprise Agency), which he used to buy a motor-mower.  Over the two-year 
period since then turnover has expanded to about £15000/year. There have been three 
critical ‘upward jumps’ in this process, each of them involving a measure of associated risk. 
On the demand side, there has been a gradual shift from the ‘domestic’ to the ‘institutional’ 
market: from individuals needing help with their gardens to institutions such as businesses, 
churches, public houses and housing trusts wishing to offer maintenance contracts. On the 
cost side, the client took out a framed advertisement in the Yellow  Pages , and also took on 
casual labour: two young men at a wage of £200/week (just above the legal minimum). This 
was a disaster: they wrecked his equipment, which was inadequately insured; and a 
maintenance contract with a housing association was lost as a consequence. At this low 
point, he experienced a serious hand injury, which at one stage caused fears of amputation. 
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          How did he get through the crisis?  On his account, through cutting costs (the wage-
labour previously mentioned), and through support from his mentor and a key customer (a 
former employer who ‘came up’ shortly after the housing association contract collapsed). 
Other enterprises in the same line of business have not been an important source of support . 
He is now looking to re-hire an apprentice, and to supplement his existing push-mower with a 
tractor-driven one.  Risk efficacy was augmented through the quick realisation of a mistake, 
through the provision of human assets in the sense of moral support by the mentor and social 
capital links with clients, and financial assets in the sense of an emergency supplementary 
loan by SENTA.  
 
Case Study 3. ‘Group A’: Scottish Enterprise Lanarkshire 
 
The group lending operation 
 
This profile is not of an individual business, but of an entire group of eight women ,formed in 
2000 in the Cumbernauld area of Lanarkshire under the supervision of the Wellpark 
Enterprise Trust (q.v.) in 2000, and now receives loan funding from Scottish Enterprise under 
the Scottish National Microfinance Programme. Although the group contains eight members 
all with their own enterprises, only two (discussed below) have loans outstanding from 
Scottish Enterprise. The group’s social capital-building capacities were recently tested when 
the group experienced a major shock -- the loss of £5000 from group assets consequent on a 
bad loan being made for a publishing project, followed by the disappearance of the defaulter. 
The solidarity built up by the group within this crisis, and not repeat loans, has got them 
through it. Formally, it increased their risk efficacy until they were just able to withstand the 
shock. 
 
The businesses 
 
Client G17 runs an internet access company from home, using an initial loan of £1500 made 
to her using her membership of the group as security.  The enterprise ‘has taken over her life’, 
but there have been dramatic drops almost to zero in monthly receipts, serious cost overruns 
and then the major default. ‘Without the solidarity of the group I would have given up years 
ago’. 
 
Clients G21 and G22 are sisters (see quotation on page xx/10), who established a bridalwear 
business three years ago (1999) and have been members of the group for one year.  One of 
them works part-time in a bank, the other as a dental nurse. They work at the dress shop ‘by 
appointment only’. When setting the business up they initially approached a commercial bank 
for a £1500 overdraft, but before considering this the bank insisted on details of their 
husbands’ work and employment history, and information on available collateral going as far 
as a new surveyor’s report on their houses. At that point they dropped their plan to seek a 
bank loan, renewing it a year later when they decided to branch out into bridesmaids’ dresses 
and to seek new premises away from the broken windows of the industrial estate where they 
had been based. They saw an advertisement for a WIN (Women in the Network) meeting and 
decided to go along. A key factor in their decision to become involved in the ‘then Wellpark’ 
group lending scheme was the women-only aspect; they have received from it a loan of 
£4500 to develop the business.  
 
They have no paid employees. Their cousin (who works as a cleaner) , however, designs for 
them increasingly. They hope that they will be able to pay her a wage in the future, when they 
can. 
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(c)  Unhappy ending: business failure, in spite of initial success 
 
Case Study 4: ‘S1’ Dressmaker and clothing retailer, Sheffield 5 
                 Black female single parent, in her 30s; educated to secondary level; had taken, at 
community college, a ‘black access course’ in introductory business skills including letter-
writing and book-keeping.   Unemployed and on benefits until she received, in January 2001, 
a loan of £5000 from SENTA (Sheffield Enterprise Agency), later topped up by a further 
£2000. Approached and was refused a loan by a commercial bank ‘on the grounds that she 
was unemployed, lacking capital, and lacking business experience’. Was introduced to 
SENTA by the David Hall Partnership (DHP), the private sector consultancy which manages 
the New Deal for Lone Parents and for the Self-Employed  in Sheffield. 
 
The client initially opened, in one of the few ethnic-minority areas in Sheffield, a shop selling 
smart ‘street wear’, appealing at that stage mainly to the black population. She expanded her 
market through advertising in clothes parties and free sheets distributed through people’s 
doors. The business proved unexpectedly seasonal, with slumps in school holidays; 
nonetheless it managed, with the help of judicious advertising guided by the SENTA mentor, 
to diversify into a broader market (basically the under-25 age group), and at its peak, In 
September 2001, her market was 60% white and  her turnover at an annual rate of 
£20000/annum. A blend of mentoring and instinct  - not, on her insistence, discussions with 
black traders in a similar position – had enabled her not only to grow fast, but also to jump the 
ethnic divide into a new market sector. Indeed, significantly for what was to come, her links 
with family and other members of the local black community loosened somewhat during this 
period: speculatively, they may have been envious of her success at this timei.  
 
The business was then cut down by two burglaries, in October 2001 and January 
2002, the second of which also involved some damage to the premises. The proximate cause 
of failure was not only the second burglary as such – the premises were insured- but that the 
insurance company involved had taken, at the time of writing, twelve months to assess the 
claim, and has paid out nothing so far. The client has been pushed back below the poverty 
line, and is now trading ‘passively’ from home, without  the possibility of advertising from 
home or a shop outlet For all its fast growth, and its ability to withstand two slumps, the 
business did not have the ‘risk efficacy’ to withstand the third. 
 
 
                  This qualitative material illustrates, first of all, the interaction of 
shocks, which are in our model, with institutions, which for the most part are 
not. Case Study 1 received the positive shock of a suddenly opening-up 
market (boosted by the growing volume of government support for childcare in 
the late nineties), took the tide at its flood, and was led on to fortune, 
eventually breaching the upper boundary of the capital market (figure 4). But 
the entrepreneur was only able to do so because its banker (DSL/Glasgow 
Regeneration Fund) flexibly expanded her loan limit on a discretionary basis: 
this is an approach which a number of microfinance institutions, with rigid 
‘progressive lending’ formulae, are unwilling to emulate. 
 
                  Case Studies 2 to 4 all received negative shocks, the last of them 
so severe as to force the client to stop trading. Crime and robbery is an 
extremely common cause of these shocks, found in all the samples but 
dramatically so in Belfast where it was common during the survey period to 
have to pay protection money in the form of a monthly fee to UVF or IRA, as 
the case may be. The question is what enabled the first two of these to 
withstand the shock (generate sufficient risk efficacy), and the last to fail to do 
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so, as from this we may learn lessons which can help microfinance borrowers 
reduce the failure rate (and hence increase the social and employment 
impact) of assisted businesses. Part of the answer lies in institutional gaps 
and institutional behaviour, which are discussed in the next section. The other 
part of the story is that in case study 1, at the top end of the small business 
market, the lender provided sufficient financial capital, and in case studies 2 
and 3 the lender and the clients between them constructed sufficient social 
capital, to provide a buffer (level of risk efficacy) against the shock, whereas in 
case study 4 both social and financial capital assets collapsed, in a vicious 
circle: the failure of the client’s financial safety-net, in the shape of an 
insurance policy, depleted her own self-confidence and willingness to push on 
in face of adversity, some of which was caused by a decline in her social 
networks. The combination of shock, lack of assets, and lack of institutional 
support, rather than any one of these in isolation, kept the client in the poverty 
trap and kept the level of the rate of return (r) below its critical level (r*) . 
Institutional support has so far been absent from our quantitative analysis, 
and we must therefore consider in our final section how to factor it into our 
policy recommendations.  
 
 
                                                 
i As  Diane Elson states (1999, p.616): 
‘Labour market institutions have typically been constructed on the assumption that women 
employees were secondary earners who would draw on the assets and earnings of men…to 
cushion them against risk. That is, labour market institutions have assumed that women have 
‘extended entitlements’ which do not have the force of law, but are sanctioned by accepted 
norms about what is a legitimate claim…Women’s very act of participating in the labour 
market, however, may weaken their extended entitlements, if it involves stepping outside what 
have been accepted as the normal roles for women. The possibility of earning an income of 
their own may empower them to make more decision about their own lives – but it may also 
cut them off from support by male kin, leaving them on their own, and newly vulnerable to 
market forces.’ 
These remarks apply a fortiori to self-employed workers, as may be seen from the experience 
of Case Study 4. 
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For discussion 
 
Table 4 – what other independent variables? 
 
Is there any need/justification to use a simultaneous-
equation estimating method? If so, what instruments to 
use? 
 
Table 5 – what other policy simulations? 
 
Final para – more on future research needed. 
 
Think about how to get to a questionnaire/interview 
schedule from here. 
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